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How Much Work Do Scientific Images Do?*,
Stephen M. Downes
In this paper, I defend the view that there aremany scientific images that
have a serious epistemic role in science but this role is not adequately
accounted for by the going view of representation and its aendant
theoretical commitments. The relevant view of representation is Laura
Perini’s account of representation for scientific images. I draw on Adina
Roskies’ work on scientific images as well as work on models in science
to support my conclusion.
I. I
As I surveyed my desk at the end of last semester, I saw piles of papers,
the result of a semester of not tidying up. Among the notes-to-self and copies
of memos to various administrators are pictures, mostly ones I have drawn.
One is a picture of the University of Utah’s budget process as it relates to my
department; another is a picture of evolutionary change presented as change in
gene frequency; another is a picture aempting to express the correspondence
theory of truth; and my favorite is a visual joke of Spike Milligan whose
caption says “It’s the lile things that count” and the picture is of lile things
adding numbers. I use pictures to think, to teach, and to communicate ideas.
I sometimes take this reliance on pictures to point to cognitive limitations.
Perhaps if I were more adept at mathematics, I would be able to present all
of these ideas more precisely and with more force. (I doubt mathematics would
help making jokes funnier.) Maybe the reliance on pictures is symptomatic of
a shared cognitive limitation we humans have or maybe we should cast this
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reliance in a more positive light and think of it as part of the standardmachinery
for much human understanding. If you look through a random selection of
current editions of science journals on the web, you will find thousands of
pictures used in many and varied ways. Some could be dismissed as decorative
or unnecessary but most, I argue, are indispensable to the relevant scientific
work. Here I focus in on a few of the many uses pictures (images) are put to
in science. My aim is to push the discussion of images in science in one of
the directions that discussions of models in science have gone: away from a
unified, representation-based account of how images work in science or do their
epistemic work.
Here is how I will proceed. First, I will fill out the claim about the prevalence
of images. As we will see, the claim is usually presented along with the claim
that philosophers ignore images in science or do not take them seriously. What
taking images seriously amounts to is rejecting the once-prevalent view that
they are mere decorations and presenting and defending an epistemic role for
them in science. Next I will say a lile about my way into the discussion about
images, which was through my interest in models and modeling in science. In
a recent paper I appear to be making the rash claim that scientific images do
not represent, which on its face sounds plain wrong (Downes 2009). Here I will
give a bit of context to that claim and hopefully defend it for one subset of
scientific images and one account of representation (a much weaker position). I
go on to present Laura Perini’s account of representation for scientific images.
Next I present a different approach to specific scientific images found in Adina
Roskies’ work. Framing Roskies’ approach as a response to Perini, we arrive at
the preliminary conclusion that one theory of representation for images fails to
apply in some cases. I add some further worries about Perini’s approach which
support a more general conclusion: there are many scientific images that have
a serious epistemic role in science but this role is not adequately accounted
for by one prominent view of representation and its aendant theoretical
commitments.
II. U    
In the 1990s more or less everyone writing about scientific images in science
studies took it upon themselves to make the case that images are ubiquitous
in science before they launched into the real work they were up to. Several
people support this ubiquity claim about images with a somewhat quantified
approach. For example, Nancy Anderson and Michael Dietrich (2012, 2) quote
Robert Blystone’s 1989 work making this point: “In the forty years following
the end of World War II the average number of pages in biology textbooks
almost doubled, the number of photographs tripled, and the pages that had no
illustration at all dwindled to only 22 percent.” As Michael Ruse (1996) notes,
the trend that Blystone identified continued, culminating in a more or less
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one-to-one ratio of illustrations to page count. Ruse points to Darnell et al.’s
massive Molecular Cell Biology textbook from 1990, which has 1,105 pages and
1,050 illustrations.
The trend has continued: science journals, textbooks, and trade-books have
a vast number of different types of images that play distinct roles. The images
scientists use range from photographs taken in good light of medium sized
live organisms―such as those used to illustrate typical features of birds or
buerflies―to highly abstract and schematic diagrams―such as biologists’
diagrams of adaptive landscapes. An image can oen be used as data or
evidence, for example, micrographs of various kinds; and just as oen (I will
argue) images are the way of presenting a model or a theoretical construct,
for example, the iconic diagram of the Bohr model of the atom. Images can be
used to represent ideal situations, to outline parts of an ideal structure or part
of a postulated process or mechanism, to render depth in two dimensions, to
illustrate mathematical expressions, and so on. There is no one use of images.
So images are widespread in science, “So what?” The next stage of this
project is to answer that question. The claim being rejected is that images
are decorations, mere sideshows to real scientific work. A weaker version of
this claim―images are pedagogical (merely pedagogical) and do not do any
epistemic work in real science―is also rejected. Rather, images are used to help
the uninitiated learn about that real science. Ruse (1996), Anderson and Dietrich
(2012), Perini (2005a; 2005b), Roskies (2007; 2008; 2012), and many others take
these claims on and understand that demonstrating themere presence of images
does not make the case for an important epistemic role for them in the sciences.
Many cite Stephen J. Gould (1991, 171) in this context: “Scientific images are
not frills or summaries; they are foci for modes of thought.” Gould here clearly
denies the mere decoration thesis and, implicitly, the mere pedagogy one too
and gestures in the direction of an epistemic role for images. Ruse develops
Gould’s point and directs it at philosophers. He says that philosophers “did
not talk about biological illustration because they did not judge it to be part
of ‘real science.’ This enterprise produces statements or propositions, ideally
embedded in a formal system” (Ruse 1996, 304). He saddles many well-known
logical empiricist philosophers of science with this view and, for good measure,
blames Plato for it and reminds us of Pierre Duhem’s position that it was only
human weakness that resulted in visual aids being required in the service of
science.
Now that the case has been made that images are an indispensable part of
science, the next task is to spell out the epistemic work that scientific images
do. As Ruse indicates, at one end of the spectrum there are those who believe
that images do no real epistemic work and, at the other end, there are those
who believe that if images do any epistemic work, there must be one unifying
account of how they do so. I hold that scientific images function in a number
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of ways, doing different kinds of epistemic work and, sometimes, none at all.
Before I turn to one account of the epistemic role of scientific images in some
detail, I will first say a lile about scientific models, as I will draw on work on
models and apply it to scientific images.
III. M
Much work in philosophy of science on models emphasizes their
representational role. Here is how Paul Teller (2001, 397) puts this point: “I take
the stand that, in principle, anything can be a model, and that what makes
a thing a model is the fact that it is regarded or used as a representation of
something by the model users. Thus in saying what a model is the weight is
shied to the problem of understanding the nature of representation.” In this
account, models stand in some representational relation to a world system or
the observable aspects of that system. This view comes along with a system of
epistemic appraisal centered around the fit of the model with the world or the
observed world. Rather than claiming that models are true or false, most have
claimed that models are isomorphic with the system they represent or similar
to that system in various respects and degrees.
In developing his influential version of this view, Ron Giere (1988; 1996;
1999a; 1999b; 2004) reminds us that any definition of models that philosophers
of science give should be constrained by what scientists take models to be.
An important part of the philosopher of science’s job, according to Giere, is
to characterize actual scientific practice. His account of a model keeps this
constraint on philosophy of science front and center: for him models are the
idealized systems discussed in scientific textbooks (Giere 1988, 78-80). Such
idealized systems can satisfy specific sets of equations, such as a simple
harmonic oscillator in mechanics, but may also be idealized systems such
as models of sea floor spreading in geology, which do not satisfy specific
sets of equations and are not even presented via equations. Continuing the
emphasis on representation, Giere provides an account of scientific theories,
which are collections or families of models that represent the world (see Figure
1). Giere takes the relevant representation relation to be one of similarity. The
representationalist view of scientific models is aractive. Our examination of
scientific practice tells us that scientists trade in models and if the epistemic
value of these objects can be cashed out in terms of some type of representation
relation, for example, similarity, then we have the makings of a nice unified
account of science. On this account science, or at least model-based science,
to use Peter Godfrey-Smith’s (2006) terminology, is successful to the extent
that scientists produce models of the world that are similar to their objects, or
observable aspects of those objects, in relevant respects and degrees.
What is the relevance of bringing up models in a paper about scientific
images? First, we need to look no further than Giere (1996, 272), who says
Spontaneous Generations 6:1(2012) 118
S. M. Downes How Much Work Do Scientific Images Do?
Model system
Model description Target system
Resembles
(is similar to)Specifies
Ron Giere’s modeling diagram (Redrawn from Giere 1988)
the model
Figure 1. Stephen M. Downes redrawn from Giere, 1988. Sketch of Giere’s view.
“[my]model-based understanding of scientific theoriesmakes it possible to treat
things like diagrams […] on a par with themore abstract theoretical models that,
on this account, form the core of any scientific theory,” For Giere, models and
images share a representation relation with their objects, both being similar to
real systems in specific respects and degrees. Giere regularly emphasizes that
truth is a relation apt for sentences but not for models or images. As we shall
see below, Perini (2005a, 2005b) disagrees with Giere about the appropriateness
of invoking truth for images. The second relevant connection between work on
models and images comes from a recent paper of mine (Downes 2009) in which
I criticize Giere and others’ similarity-based accounts of representation for both
models and pictures in the same way. I go on to claim, but not express or argue
for in much detail, that both models and images play important roles in science
that cannot all be accounted for by appealing to any of the going notions of
representation. This implies that I hold the view that scientific images do not
represent. I aim to explain this thesis of that paper by defending a much weaker
version of it here. But first, I turn to Perini’s view of images.
IV. P     .
Perini has made helpful inroads into the problem of how scientific images
do their epistemic work. She presents and defends an account derived from
Nelson Goodman’s (1976) symbolic approach to understanding pictures, which
allows us to understand them as either true or false. Pictures for Perini
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include “photographs, perspective drawings, courtroom sketches, etc.” (Perini
2005a, 273). The key for her is to establish that pictures themselves have
truth conditions, rather than the various sentences that guide our use and
understanding of the pictures. As she puts it, “Demonstrating that scientific
figures can bear truth will require showing that their symbol systems support
the capacity to bear truth, independent of mediation by other representations
to assign meanings to individual members of the visual symbol system
(that is, without using linguistic representations as the underlying system)”
(Perini 2005a, 274-75). She argues that her approach can be applied fairly
straightforwardly to scientific diagrams that can be broken down into atomic
parts, whose relations to one another can be expressed linguistically. However,
there are worries that images such as electron micrographs may not be
susceptible to her analysis. Even in this case and similarly worrisome cases she
claims that an “informal” description of the relation between the image and
its object can be given. From this reasoning, she concludes that “an electron
micrograph is true IFF the shape of the micrograph is a geometric projection of
the shape of the sample scanned in producing the micrograph” (Perini 2005a,
280). Figure 2 is a sketch of her view.
Images
Evidence
Target system
Represent
(“are true of”)
Sketch of Perini’s account of how scientific images work
Spatial relations between elements = form;
form determines content.
via
Figure 2. Stephen M. Downes. Sketch of Perini’s account of how scientific images work.
Perini (2005a; 2005b) takes a slightly different tack when she tackles
the role of images in confirmation. Again she deploys the symbolic view of
representations. Visual images in science represent in virtue of their “spatial
features that are interpreted to mean something about the[ir] referent”
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Figure 3. Ideal cell drawing.1
(Perini 2005a, 914). She continues: “Other visible features like color may also
contribute to the meaning of visual representations, depending on the system,
but the referential role of spatial relations is the defining feature of visual
representations. Because of this, the visible forms of visual representations are
related to their referents” (Perini 2005, 914). For pictures, like micrographs,
the following is needed to secure their role in the confirmation of scientific
hypotheses: “the causal relation between visible form of the micrograph and
the structure of the sample is a source of the credibility of the representations
that are produced, and allows for representation of novel and complex
phenomena” (Perini 2005a, 921). Spatial relations make a definitive contribution
to confirmation that linguistic representations of the same phenomena cannot
make and images are causally “correlated” with their referents and, as a result,
play a similar role to observations.
Along the way, Perini introduces some useful distinctions. One that I will
refer back to in more detail is her distinction between schematic diagrams and
compositional diagrams. Schematic diagrams include pictures of an ideal cell
or ideal cell type (see Figure 3). There is no aempt in this type of diagram
to present in detail one particular cell, for example, as viewed through a light
microscope. Compositional diagrams include the familiar images in molecular
biology texts such as presentations of the double helix (see Figure 4). These
diagrams are used to show the components of a system, say a strand of DNA,
and aspects of how that system works, in this case the appropriate nucleotide
1 “Animal cell structure” (2006) fromhp://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Animal cell structure en.svg.
Creative Commons Aribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.
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Figure 4. DNA replication diagram.2
pairings are emphasized. Perini’s view and the useful distinctions that arise from
developing her view can only arise from careful work on specific examples from
scientific practice.
Overall, Perini’s view requires us to view images as having a distinct form
(in Goodman’s terms, they are distinct symbolic systems) that sets them apart
from linguistic representations. Understood this way, scientific images have an
important, independent epistemic role to play and this role can be cashed out
in terms of her theory of how images represent. In what follows I challenge this
laer component of her view in a number of different ways. First, in order to
develop some of these challenges, I turn to some recent work on another set of
scientific images: Adina Roskies’ (2007; 2008; 2012) work on fMRI images.
V. A     ?
Roskies (2007; 2008; 2012) has recently argued that certain images in
neuroscience should not be treated as “photographs of the brain.” She makes
this case partly because most of us do treat neuroimages such as fMRI images
as photographs of the brain (see Figure 5). Roskies argues that this is a
mistake. According to Roskies, some scientific images are photographs in the
most straightforward sense and do function as direct evidence (proxies for
2 “DNA replication split” (2007) from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:DNA replication split.svg.
Creative Commons Aribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported license.
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observations) (see Figure 6). Roskies introduces a useful notion for assessing the
evidential power of images: a scale ranging from inferential closeness to varying
degrees of inferential distance. Applying this scale, the birdwatching photograph
(Figure 6) is inferentially close to its subject maer. Roskies relies on some
machinery from Kendal Walton in aesthetics in her discussion of photographs,
agreeing with Walton that photographs like this allow us to “see through” to
their objects (Walton 1984). Photographs are more or less direct representations
and share many properties with their objects. Obviously there is a huge range
of photographs and photographic techniques, some of which produce images
that are not direct in this way, but these points seem applicable to the bird
photograph (Figure 6) and its ilk.
Figure 5. fMRI image. Courtesy of a Scanning Lab at the University of Utah. fMRI image.
In contrast, neuroimages such as the fMRI images (Figure 5) are inferentially
distant from their objects. Roskies is careful to point out that her claim is very
local and that the inferential distance in question arises from the specifics of
how these particular images are generated. Briefly, the apparent picture of the
brain we see in fMRI images is produced by combining thousands of slices of
the brain into one composite 2-D (or sometimes 3-D) image. The image we see
is the result of this process plus a great deal of statistical manipulation. Roskies
does not deny that neuroimages of this kind have an important role to play in
neuroscience but, crucially she does deny that they photograph or depict the
brain in any standard sense. As a result, such images should not be viewed as
proxy for direct observations nor should their epistemic role be accounted for
via direct representation (see Figure 7).
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Figure 6. Bird photo. Stephen M. Downes.
Roskies goes on to add a general observation about images: images are
seductive because we are such visual beings. All sighted humans interact with
our world via vision more so than any of the other senses. When an image is
presented to us, we automatically think that it tells us what something looks like.
Roskies adds that this disposes us to think of images in “photographic” or direct
representational terms. As her argument implies, to follow this instinct in the
case of many scientific images can lead philosophers to a mistaken assessment
of the epistemic role of images. Before turning to more general issues about the
roles of images in science I want to briefly present Roskies’ case as a response to
Perini as a way of showing that this gets us to part of what I want to conclude
about scientific images.
One thing Roskies and Perini agree on is that images play some sort of
evidential role in science. Also, they both agree that some images have a more
direct and clearer relation to their objects. I agree that one role of scientific
images is clearly evidential: they can act as proxy observations, but, even in
straightforward seeming cases, problems can arise. Looking at another image,
taken from Sarah Bush and her collaborators’ work on avian lice, helps exemplify
this point (see Figure 8). Bush et al.’s conclusion is that their “results suggest
that background matching coloration has evolved in feather lice in response
to host preening” (2010, 534). They also find support for the more general
conclusion that host-mediated selection has led to diversification among many
ectoparasites whose hosts carry out some kind of grooming. The images Bush
et al. use are evidential in the most straightforward way: closest to photographs
Spontaneous Generations 6:1(2012) 124
S. M. Downes How Much Work Do Scientific Images Do?
Image
Evidence
Target system
is “inferentially distant from”
or*
Sketch of Roskies’ account of how scientific images work
*  Roskies has a scale in mind here rather than evidence of only two
    alternate strengths.
Photograph of
(directly represents)
Figure 7. Stephen M. Downes. Sketch of Roskies’ account of how scientific images work.
in Roskies’ terms―they are photographs! Part of Bush et al.’s work involves
photographing the various bird lice under exactly the same lighting conditions
and comparing their color. The two different types of cockatoo lice are strikingly
different but the researchers made efforts to find other paerns in louse
coloration, for example, whether different colors are continuous or discrete
within species. There is a clear role for such images as proxy observations in
the sciences. Even in cases such as this though, I am skeptical that the relevant
images are susceptible to a Perini-style analysis; how they do their work for
the scientist does not seem to be accounted for in her spatial relations view of
content determination.
Aswe have seen, Perini stresses the role of spatial relations between elements
of images in determining their content. Recall that Perini (2005, 914) says
that color may play a role in the way images work, but that the “referential
role of spatial relations is the defining feature of visual representations.” The
relevant colors in the Bush et al. work are not particularly elaborate―almost
black and near white―but they are the key variable being presented in the
images. This point at least calls for an extension of Perini’s approach to colors
but conceding this may lead to more problems for her. Roskies’ point that
photographs represent via reproducing many of the properties of their objects
is worth bearing in mind here. If we want to capture the way in which scientific
images, such as the one Bush et al. use, work in the sciences, we need to bring
in the role of color. As I said, the colors in this case are not elaborate. In other
Spontaneous Generations 6:1(2012) 125
S. M. Downes How Much Work Do Scientific Images Do?
Figure 8. From Sarah Bush, Dukgun Kim, Michelle Reed, and Dale H. Clayton. Cockatoos and
Cockatoo Lice
areas of neuroscience, work leading to the production of the image illustrated
in Figure 9 color is very important. A huge amount of time and effort goes into
making different fluorescent dyes bind to different cell types and organelles. This
process of color labeling is theway that data is retrieved from these experimental
systems. Perini’s account, relying heavily on spatial relations, may lack the
dimensionality to account for the work done by a large number of color images
in science.
Roskies’ work brings up a further issue about the relevant players in the
proposed symbolic system contained by scientific images. She has a different
take than Perini on what we should take away from the causal correlation
between images and their objects. Perini and Roskies clearly agree that the
appropriate causal correlation between images and their objects is key and both
see a scale going from straightforward photographs and diagrams on the one
end to micrographs and fMRI images on the other; their interpretations of this
scale are quite different. For Perini, images such as micrographs can be shown
to have content, determined from spatial relations between their elements, that
allows us to see them as representations of their objects. Roskies’ argues that
fMRI images are far too “inferentially distant” from their objects to support the
view that the images represent that object. This implies that learning about the
causal process of producing these kinds of images does not support the idea that
the spatial relations in the image reflect corresponding relations in their objects.
You could object that this last move is a lile unfair, because fMRI images
are not micrographs (the images Perini focuses on). Fair enough, but careful
aention to the way many images are produced in science reveals that they do
not all function as proxy observations or as photographs of parts of the natural
world. I do not have in mind deliberate misrepresentations of states of affairs
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Figure 9. Photo taken by Cynthia Levinthal at Q Therapeutics’ lab. Neoroscience image.
here either. Carefully photoshopping in a missing wedding guest in a wedding
photo is a causal process that results in an image that does not accurately
capture the original scene, but this is not the kind of causal process that usually
goes on in scientific images’ production. Many scientific images are carefully
constructed and, due to the visual seduction Roskies talks about, we take these
constructed images to look like their assumed objects. Scientific images are
constructed via manipulation of both the image product and the source. As
Roskies shows in the case of fMRIs, there is a huge amount of processing that
goes into presenting the relevant signals in a form that looks like a picture of the
brain. fMRI’s are not an isolated case: to produce the image of activities in neural
cells (Figure 9), many individual micrographs are taken of many tissues, each
stained with different fluorescent dyes. Further work goes into manipulating the
depth of the sample of tissue used. The resulting imagemay have the appearance
of being a picture of a cell or part of a cell, but it functions to reveal or display the
relevant data to the scientist. Images functioning this way are beer understood
as having a similar role to graphs. We rarely think of graphs as revealing the
spatial relations between objects in the world; rather, we understand them as a
way of presenting relations between data points or proving a visual presentation
of an equation. Focusing on the causal process that leads to image production
does not reveal the smooth continuum that Perini indicates it should. Instead
it reveals roles of images other than the direct representation of processes,
systems, and mechanisms in the world. So some scientific images seem not to
represent on Perini’s terms.
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VI. I, M,  R R
In my discussion so far I have, along with Perini and Roskies, taken images
to play an evidential role. I now want to look at other roles that images
can play in science that is not evidential in any straightforward way. I begin
this discussion by returning to Perini’s distinction between schematic and
compositional diagrams and then introduce some of the insights from recent
work on models to support the conclusion that many scientific images are not
best understood as direct representations of their presumed objects.
Perini’s distinction between schematic and compositional images is a useful
one, but perhaps not for advancing her view that images resemble their
referents. The DNA diagrams familiar in molecular biology are nice examples
of compositional images (Figure 4). These images are schematic pictures of the
salient parts of DNAmolecules in the double helix model andmany idealizations
and assumptions are built into these diagrams. They do a good job of illustrating
some of the key features of DNA, but are a long way from a picture of a DNA
molecule in situ in the nucleus of a cell. These kinds of considerations are among
those that incline me to refer to such diagrams as model descriptions (or part of
the model description). This claim derives from the recent work on scientific
models I introduced earlier. It is prey uncontroversial among philosophers
of science working on models to hold that some scientific images are model
descriptions or key components of model descriptions. Godfrey-Smith (2006), for
example, says that model descriptions can be mathematical formulas, words or
pictures. The notion of a model description comes originally from Giere and has
been developed and elaborated upon by Michael Weisberg (2007; forthcoming)
and JohnMahewson (2012), among others. If scientific images do play this role,
their content is not determined via a relation between spatial relations in the
image and relations between components of a system in the world.
I also hold a stronger andmore controversial view: some scientific images are
models themselves. For example, I have argued that iconic schematic diagrams,
such as diagrams of the animal cell (such as Figure 3), are models (Downes 1992).
Giere (e.g. 1996) holds this view too, but he holds it for different reasons than I
do. The connection he sees between images and models is their shared mode
of representation. When the relevant image is what scientists use to further
inquiry into an area and the image does not stand for or abbreviate a set of
equations or clearly describe or specify another model, I take the image to be a
model. Images that I take to bemodels and images that act asmodel descriptions
do not constitute evidence in any familiar sense of the term. They play a very
different role in scientific inquiry. When dealing with the presentation of models
via images or the construction of images as models, scientists engage in a
process not that far removed from mathematical model building. Sometimes
the aim of the construction process is to represent part of a system in the world,
but just as oen the aim is quite different. The image can stand for a highly
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abstract, postulated process or system, which may ultimately help explain the
way systems in the world function. It is in this aenuated sense that I want
to say that some scientific images do not represent parts of the world. As a
result, the epistemic work images do cannot be accounted for via an account
of representation that characterizes relations between images and objects in the
world.
My claim that some scientific images are models is not the consensus view,
but many agree that the model/image boundary, just as the model/equation
boundary and the model/object boundary, is blurry. Many define models
narrowly enough to avoid these worries, but if you are more liberal about what
counts as a model, as I am and many scientists are, these worries abound. As I
have argued, I do not agree with Perini that we can secure one account of how all
scientific images represent and use it to account for their epistemic importance
in science. I do think that her distinction between schematic and compositional
images is an important and useful one. Here though, I see the distinction as an
important one to guide work on the blurred line between images and models
in certain areas of scientific practice, rather than contributing to her project of
finding “truth in pictures.”Workingwith scientists on theway inwhich scientists
use specific schematic and compositional images will help further our work in
this area. I predict that this work will multiply our accounts of the way in which
scientific images contribute to science, rather than support a unified view of the
epistemic work scientific images do based on one account of representation.
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